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1
Conscientious objection to abortion: Zambian healthcare practitioners’ beliefs and practices 

Abstract 
The potential health consequences of limiting access to safe abortion make it imperative to understand how 
conscience-based refusal to provide legally permitted services is understood and carried out by healthcare 
practitioners.  This in-depth study of conscientious objection to abortion provision in Zambia is based on 
qualitative interviews (N=51) with practitioners working across the health system who object and do not object 
to providing abortion services in accordance with their cadre.  Interviews were conducted in September 2015. 	
Regardless of whether practitioners self-identified as providers or non-providers of abortion services, they 

presented similar religiously-informed understandings of abortion as a morally-challenging practice that is, or 
not, shifted from iniquity to acceptability based on the reasons for which it has been requested or the likelihood 
of unsafe abortion if services are not provided.  These contextual factors presented a series of tipping points for 
participants, rather than a single justification for providing abortion.  Subsequently both groups reported that 
their decisions about providing services were complex and changeable, rather than clear one-time resolutions.  
This shaped their practices, both in terms of whether or not they provided services, and when and how they 
delivered them.  Practitioners self-identifying as non-providers, and those self-identifying as providers, reported 
provision, counselling, and referral practices likely to lessen women’s access to safe legal abortion.  In this way, 
conscientious objection in practice could be understood as a continuum of behaviours rather than a binary 	
position.  Our results suggest that data on prevalence of claims to conscientious objector status may 

underestimate the impact of practitioners’ religious, moral and ethical beliefs on abortion accessibility.  In 
Zambia, eliminating practitioners’ right to conscientious objection alone or conducting rights-based advocacy 
may therefore not significantly increase access to safe abortion.   

Key words 
Zambia; Abortion; Conscientious objection; Healthcare practitioner attitudes; Access to safe abortion 

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2
Main Text 
Introduction  	
Conscientious objection to abortion - the refusal to provide legally permitted abortion on the basis of religious, 

moral or ethical beliefs - is fundamentally about rights: the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
the right to health; the right to reproductive freedom.  However, in settings in which conscientious objection is 
highly prevalent and abortion services are limited, conscientious objection is also about public health and equity. 
Data on the prevalence of conscientious objection are scarce and problematic.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, using a 
cross-sectional census, AwoonorWilliams et al. (2018) reported prevalence of selfidentified conscientious 
objection among physicians, midwives, nurses, and physician assistants of almost 40 percent in hospital 
facilities in northern Ghana; more than 25 percent of midwives attending a conference in Ethiopia indicated they 
would not provide abortion services in Holcombe et al. (2015)’s cross-sectional survey; and an ethnographic 
study of Senegalese obstetrician-gynaecologists, midwives and nurses reported by (Chavkin et al., 2013) found 	
very few providers were willing to provide abortion services they believed should be available.   

Where the practice of conscientious objection significantly reduces the number of providers of safe legal 
abortion, it is likely that women will experience delays in obtaining safe abortion, seek illegal abortion 
elsewhere, or continue their unwanted pregnancy.  Later abortions increase the risk of complications, limit the 
choice of appropriate abortion method, are more expensive than earlier abortions and may be beyond legal 
gestational limits for abortion.  Illegal abortions performed outside formal health systems are more likely to be 
performed using unsafe methods, by a provider without the necessary skills, or in an environment not 
conforming to minimal medical standards.  More than 25 million unsafe abortions occur annually (Ganatra et 
al., 2017);  estimates of morbidity and mortality from unsafe abortion suggest that around a quarter result in 
severe complications requiring hospital-based treatment, at least 46,000 result in death, and 3 million in 	
complications that are not treated sufficiently (Singh, 2010).   

Widespread conscientious objection is likely to have a disproportionate impact on those with the fewest social 
or economic resources.  Healthcare practitioners carry out their conscience-based objections to abortion 
inconsistently, and may be more likely to refuse abortion for certain subgroups, such as adolescents (Morrell & 
Chavkin, 2015).  Women who experience provider objection and request abortion from another safe provider 
must either spend longer within the same facility or travel to another facility to obtain services, incurring 
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3
economic and social costs that are inequitably distributed.  Should women instead seek abortion from elsewhere 
that is unsafe, post-abortion care may be more costly than accessing safe legal abortion (Leone et al., 2016).  
Conscientious objection in Zambia 
In Zambia abortion is permitted if continuing pregnancy poses a risk to the life of the pregnant woman, to the 	
physical or mental health of the woman or her existing children, if the child would be seriously disabled by 

physical or mental abnormalities (GRZ, 1972) or in cases of rape or incest (GRZ, 2005).  In determining 
whether the risk posed by continuing the pregnancy is greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, account 
may be taken of the pregnant woman’s reasonably foreseeable environment and her age.  Abortions must be 
carried out by a registered medical practitioner (a doctor).  When the abortion is not immediately necessary to 
save the life of the woman or prevent grave permanent injury, three registered medical practitioners, one of 
whom must be a specialist, must give consent (GRZ, 1972).   
The Termination of Pregnancy Act (1972) provides for conscientious objection to abortion but notes that it does 
not extend to practitioners’ “duty to participate in any treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent 
grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman” (4.2).  The Ministry of Health’s 	
Standards and Guidelines on abortion (2009), current at the time of our research, aim to balance practitioners’ 

right to conscientious objection with clients’ rights to accurate information and access to safe services.  With 
reference to “healthcare providers”, rather than the “medical practitioners” permitted to perform the abortion 
procedure, the Standards note (p.9):  
• Clients must be “respectfully referred” to healthcare providers willing to assist them in obtaining 
services; 
• With some exceptions, the management of all government-supported healthcare facilities have the 
obligation to ensure that women have access to the abortion services they are legally entitled to;  
• Conscientious objection may only be claimed at an individual level, and not as a group or institution;  
• Conscientious objection only applies to the abortion procedure and not broader services; 	
• Conscientious objection only applies to the abortion provider and does not extend to support personnel. 

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4
However, conscientious objection in Zambia is unregulated.  There is no requirement for medical practitioners 	
to record their refusal to provide abortion, making the management of services difficult.  There are no estimates 	
of the prevalence of conscientious objection, but the practice is expected to be widespread, and, along with the 	
secrecy around which doctors do provide abortion, limit women’s access to safe services (Ngoma et al., 2017).  	
Given low public knowledge around the legal availability of abortion (Cresswell et al., 2016), women seeking 	
abortion for reasons permitted within the law are unlikely to know that services should be made available to 	
them (Coast, 2016).  	
The Zambian case is unlikely to be extraordinary.  The breadth of Zambia’s legal framework for abortion is 	
uncommon, but not unique in Africa.  Moreover, the limited accessibility of safe abortion services in public 		
facilities is likely to mirror that identified in countries across the continent, regardless of the legal and policy 	

frameworks in place.  While there are no nationally aggregated data on the incidence of un/safe abortion in 

Zambia (Macha et al., 2014), and abortion-related deaths are difficult to measure and estimate (Gerdts et al., 

2013), the consequences of limiting access to abortion are commonplace: the 31.2 % of Zambian maternal 

mortality occurring in the antepartum period which includes abortion is broadly consistent with other countries 

in the region (Merdad & Ali, 2018).   

Conceptualising conscientious objection 

The potential health consequences of conscientious objection for women’s access to safe abortion make it 

imperative to understand healthcare practitioners’ motivations for claiming it and how they perform it in 

practice.  However, conscientious objection is understudied and under-theorised.  While the definition of 
	
conscientious objection is relatively clear, there are no agreed criteria for what it means to be a conscientious 


objector, and subsequently, how it should be measured so that adequate services can be planned.  Must a 
practitioner self-identify as a conscientious objector for it to count as such?  Is a practitioner a conscientious 
objector if they refuse to provide abortion in every circumstance, or conversely, if they refuse in any 
circumstance?  Is a practitioner a conscientious objector only when their actions align with a country’s law 
and/or policy (e.g. always referring clients in absence of providing the abortion procedure) or should 
‘illegitimate’ objection – that which is not provided for by law or policy (e.g. not providing the abortion 
procedure and not referring clients) – also be included?  
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5
Based on criteria for conceptualising conscientious objection to military service that include establishing that an 
individual’s beliefs are deeply held and applicable in any circumstance of war, conscientious objection to 	
providing abortion is often presented as a binary position that ought to be consistently held.  Much of the limited 

research in this area has subsequently reflected on whether practitioners refusing to provide abortion services are 
exercising ‘true’ conscientious objection or not.  For example, evidence that practitioners in Brazil obtained 
abortion for themselves or their partners despite reporting religious objection to abortion (Faúndes et al., 2004) 
and that practitioners in South Africa claiming conscientious objection provided services for additional financial 
remuneration (Harries et al., 2014) has been used to argue that some practitioners claim conscientious objection 
for reasons other than deeply held religious, moral or ethical beliefs (Chavkin et al., 2013).  Other studies have 
highlighted practitioners who report objection to abortion based on beliefs that are understood to be genuine, but 
apply their objection inconsistently or inappropriately.  In Colombia, Fink et al. (2016) identify among those 
who identify as conscientious objectors “partial objectors”, who exercise their refusal on a case-by-case basis, 	
along with “extreme objectors”, who always oppose abortion and additionally obfuscate care by not providing 

appropriate information or referral.  González Vélez and Urbano (2016) argue that actions of extreme objectors 
are an imposition of beliefs rather than an exercise of conscience and should not be considered conscientious 
objection at all.  
Harris et al. (2016) have developed a conceptual model of conscientious objection based on three domains: 
healthcare practitioners’ beliefs, actions and self-identification.  The model addresses complexity in how 
conscientious objection is applied by identifying conscientious objection in these domains independently, noting 
that they may not always align in an individual clinician’s practices.  For example, the model takes into account 
practitioners who consistently refuse to provide services on religious grounds, but who do not identify as 
‘conscientious objectors’ because they are unfamiliar with the concept.  It also facilitates reflection on the 	
differences between conscientious objectors who refer clients to another provider, and ‘abortion obstructers’ 

who do not.  
Debates about the conceptualisation and nomenclature of conscientious objection are extended when the beliefs 
and practices of healthcare practitioners who provide abortion are considered.  One strand of this has been a call 
to recognise that practitioners’ decisions to not object to provide abortion are also conscience-based.  By 
associating religious, moral and ethical conscience only with objecting to abortion, policies and laws fail to 
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6
protect practitioners who feel compelled to provide and abortion providers are vulnerable to stigmatising 
understandings that their actions reflect having a bad or no conscience (Harris, 2012).  
Another, distinct, body of research focusing only on abortion providers’ experiences rather than conscientious 
objectors’, suggests that providers’ religious, moral or ethical beliefs might also stand in opposition to their 	
decision to provide.  In Italy De Zordo (2018) identifies obstetrician-gynaecologists who provide abortion 

services but remain somewhat uncomfortable with the ‘unpleasant’ procedure of terminating a potential life.  In 
Ghana, Aniteye and Mayhew (2013) explore how abortion providers navigate tensions they experience between 
their moral beliefs and their professional obligations.  In Scotland, Beynon-Jones (2013) explores how health 
practitioners who typically framed abortion as a pregnant woman’s choice simultaneously distinguished 
between understandable and problematic abortion requests, based on their personal rather than professional 
interpretation of the significance of the woman’s characteristics.  For example, associating successful 
motherhood with stable partnership, wealth and more advanced age, young women’s requests for abortion were 
constructed as rational and obvious, while the requests of women in their thirties with established careers and 
families were positioned as irrational and more challenging for practitioners.  	
The evidence points to a complicated picture of abortion care delivery that involves healthcare practitioners 

influencing women’s access to safe, legal services based on their conscience to varying degrees.  This is the first 
study in Zambia to explore healthcare practitioners’ abortion-related beliefs and decision-making in depth.  We 
consider the experiences of practitioners who conscientiously object to abortion alongside those who do not in 
order to investigate divergences – or similarities.  In doing so, we contribute evidence to support the 
conceptualisation of conscientious objection to abortion in Zambia needed to plan adequate abortion care.   

Methods 
While Zambian law around conscientious objection applies exclusively to doctors, in practice access to abortion 
is shaped by the beliefs and professional behaviours of all the healthcare practitioners a woman may encounter 	
in seeking services: clinical officers (mid-level clinicians equivalent to nurse practitioners in North America and 

Europe who provide the majority of first-line health care in Zambia), community healthcare workers (lay 
members of the community trained to provide basic health services and advice), midwives, nurses, as well as 
doctors.  Non-doctors may facilitate or obstruct a woman’s access to abortion by their pre-abortion counselling 
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7
or (non-)referral to doctors.  We considered all cadres of healthcare practitioners involved in women’s 
trajectories from entering the public healthcare system seeking abortion, to exiting having either received or not 
received it.  To juxtapose and examine factors we expected to influence practitioners’ understandings and 
practices, we considered both rural and urban settings, and two provinces (Lusaka and Eastern) that are better 
and less well served by doctors permitted to perform abortion (Ferrinho et al., 2011).  
Potential participants were identified by a practitioner gatekeeper with considerable knowledge of the public 	
healthcare system and access to a wide range of practitioners working in different settings, having been involved 

in the delivery of obstetrics and gynaecology training for many years.  Participants worked at the country’s main 
teaching hospital, urban and rural district hospitals, a mission hospital, urban and rural health centres, and within 
two rural communities.  While we visited many of these facilitates to recruit participants, on one visit to an 
urban facility in Eastern province we discovered a training event was being hosted, attended by practitioners 
from health facilities across the province.  This presented an opportunity to further expand our sample.     
We present qualitative data generated using audio-recorded interviews with 51 of these purposefully and 
opportunistically sampled healthcare practitioners (Table 1), conducted in September 2015.  Since so little is 
known about how practitioners understand abortion and deliver or do not deliver abortion services, we designed 
the relatively unstructured interviews to maximise our opportunities to uncover unexpected relationships and 	
concepts.  We carried out most of the interviews in English, and a research assistant, guided by a list of topics 

we prepared for her, conducted the eight interviews with community healthcare workers in Nyanja.   	
The content of interviews varied between participants, but typically covered whether or not participants 	
identified as providers of the abortion services that would be expected relative to their role, how they came to 	
their decisions, their thoughts about abortion and those who seek abortion, how they deliver services, and their 	
understanding of the law and policy around abortion and conscientious objection.  Since our gatekeeper knew 	
whether doctors working at the same facility as him objected to or provided abortion, we were able to sample 	
accordingly.  We discovered the position of all other participants during the interviews.  Concepts and 	
experiences we identified in earlier interviews were explored with participants we interviewed later.   	
Participants were encouraged to discuss their understandings of abortion and care, giving insight into the 		
normative lenses through which they perceived the world around them, as well as descriptions and examples of 	

actual events and interactions.  Our analysis takes both into account.  

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8
Interviews were all conducted at the participants’ place of work during breaks within their shifts or the training 

event.  This typically dictated the length of interviews, which ranged from around 20 minutes to just over an 

hour.  Shorter interviews covered the key themes but in less depth.  

Analysis 

We conducted a highly inductive analysis using many of the analytical tools of constructivist grounded theory 

(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  All interviews were transcribed verbatim, and those with community health workers 

were simultaneously translated into English. We used NVivo 11 Plus to facilitate our analysis.   

To prepare data for in-depth analysis, EF read each transcript, grouping data line-by-line into fluid concepts and 
	
themes according to the perspectives, experiences and practices identified within and across them (coding).  


Using the codes EF had developed, but remaining open to refining or producing new codes, EC coded a 50
percent random sample of the transcripts.  This double coding ensured we did not overlook any key themes and 
that each code collected together all the data pertaining to it.  This exercise did not identify any further themes 
or data that had not already been assigned a code. 
Cases were categorised by role, place of work, gender and position on providing abortion services to allow 
subsequent analyses to take account of these differences between participants.  We did not ask all participants 
whether or not they were “conscientious objectors” since many were not aware of the concept or its legal 
provision.  However all were asked whether or not they provided abortion services, and we categorised them 
depending on their answers.  In the analysis and the results presented, we use the term ‘non-providers’ to 	
describe participants who self-identified as practitioners who refuse to provide abortion services pertaining to 

their role (for clinical officers, nurses, midwives and community health workers, delivering counselling and 
referring to a doctor for abortion; for doctors, providing abortion), and ‘providers’ to describe participants who 
self-identified as practitioners who provide abortion services pertaining to their role.  The positions of a small 
number of participants (n=4) were difficult to ascertain: their narratives either oscillated between descriptions of 
practice that implied they did not provide abortion services or did provide abortion services, or between reports 
that they had never been approached by women seeking abortion or that they had – or might have been.   We 
categorised these cases as having ‘unclear’ provider/non-provider status and the contradictory nature of their 
narratives is reflected in our analysis.  
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9
Further in-depth analysis, which constitutes the most substantive part of our analytical method, was carried out 	
by EF and began by producing sets of memos about individual topics (e.g. referral).  These memos posed and 

answered a series of questions of the coded data, moving from more simple questions (e.g. ‘What are the 
reasons providers give for providing abortion services?’) to more evolved questions based on the answers (e.g. 
‘What discourses are being used to explain provision of abortion?’).  Answering questions involved referencing 
individual cases, allowing EF to see the range of perspectives, experiences and practices represented in the data 
and guard against selectivity in its use.  Each memo additionally included a summary of EF’s analytical 
thoughts on what the data suggest about the memo topic and subsequent questions to ask of the data in further 
memos.  Memos continued to be (re)written to document the increasingly elaborated and abstracted analysis and 
the evidence for it.  The final stage of our analysis was to sort the successive memos in the way that best 
presented the relationship between the various analytical ideas.  This emergent central analytical ‘story’ was 	
then refined by reviewing its internal consistency and testing it against the raw, uncoded data to check that it 

could explain most cases .  EC independently reviewed each memo and the analytical story as a final check that 
both were grounded in the evidence.  
Data generation and our analysis were reflexive, taking account of the questions participants had been asked and 
how we asked them, as well as the influence of our own perspectives on abortion.  The anonymised quotations 
presented below are from a wide range of participants; pseudonyms are used.  Non-doctors quoted are speaking 
about providing abortion services corresponding to their role.  
Independent ethical review was carried out and granted by ERES Converge (Zambia) and the London School of 
Economics (UK). 
Limitations	
We present practitioners’ reports of their understandings and behaviours.  While these are rich and give us 

insight into how their practices might influence women’s ability to access safe services, they cannot represent 
women’s experiences.  Our assumptions about the likely impact of the counselling, referral and provision 
practices they report are supported by research from elsewhere (Chavkin et al., 2013).  However we have no 
evidence about how the interactions healthcare practitioners reported were experienced by their clients, and how 
those interactions influenced their clients’ subsequent care-seeking.  
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10
Our purposive and opportunistic sample was designed to maximise variation in participants’ roles, settings and, 
where known before interview, conscientious objection.  Our study was not designed to estimate the prevalence 
of, or make generalisations about, conscientious objection-related understandings or behaviours, but to elucidate 
explanations for them and explore the mechanisms through which they operate.  The iterative, relatively 	
unstructured, interviews were designed to prioritise what was salient for participants, rather than answer pre-

determined questions based exclusively on existing frameworks for understanding conscientious objection to 
abortion, such as those around understandings of professionalism or person-centred care.  

Results  
1. Beliefs about abortion 
Christian religious beliefs were at the heart of non-providers’ reasons for not providing or assisting with 
abortion; their narratives unambiguously present abortion as the unjust act of killing a living being.  Other 
reasons for objecting to abortion– for example, that a woman should have used contraception or that a 
participant’s professional role is to prevent harm – were the articulation of this religiously-informed resistance.   	
“I’m a Christian… if we are going to say that we are Christians, what is wrong, is wrong, it doesn’t 

become good sometimes… I am a Christian … I can’t give people anything other than what I am.” 
[Doctor, female, non-provider] 
Providers typically did not use the same explicitly religious language to describe abortion.  However, the way 
non-providers and providers, of all cadres and working in all settings, presented their motivations for either not 
providing or providing abortion was remarkably similar.  Both understood their personal religious convictions to 
be at odds with abortion.  Both anchored our research conversations around the reasons women sought abortion 
and the consequences of unsafe abortion.  Both discussed these reasons as being either “not enough” or 
“enough” for them to provide services in light of their beliefs.    
Non-providers highlighted clients who sought abortion because they had not used contraception, were in school, 	
had had extra-marital sex or had been raped, and offered counter-arguments to the need for abortion in these 

circumstances.  For example, a pregnancy must have been wanted if contraception was not used, an adolescent 
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could return to school after the birth, a sexual sin would not be alleviated by committing the additional sin of 
abortion, and a rape victim should be spared the additional trauma of abortion:  
“The trauma, the child goes through [when raped], it is terrible but you know, still, if we do terminate 
that pregnancy …You're not solving the problem… trauma will still be there: ‘I aborted, I aborted!’ 
you know?” [Senior midwife, female, non-provider] 
Non-providers reported that reasons for seeking abortion like these were “not convincing”.  Only abortion with 
clear medical indications, such as eclampsia, was widely considered to be morally acceptable:   
“We can have some exceptions… there are mothers who have medical conditions which may not 	
support that pregnancy.  You end up losing the mother and having lost the mother, the baby also.” 

[Doctor, male, non-provider]  	
Self-identified providers discussed many of the same reasons clients seek abortion - not using contraception, 	
wanting to continue education, socially-unsanctioned sex, rape - but additionally lacking choices in society, 	
lacking education about contraception and contraceptive failure.  lthough a small minority of providers 	
presented these reasons as the reality that underpins why some women need abortion that is their right regardless 	
of their reasons for seeking it, the most dominant narrative, echoing that of non-providers, was that these 	
reasons were or were not “convincing enough” to justify their providing abortion services.   	
 “[Whether or not I provide] is more to do with the reasons that they have, especially if they are 	
obstetric reasons…or if they can manage to convince me that they cannot cope with this baby.  We 		
cannot just [provide abortion].” [Doctor, male, provider]  	

However, providers’ discussion of these socially-oriented reasons for abortion was far less frequent than their 

discussion of medically-focused reasons for abortion.  Almost all offered preventing physical ill-health or death 

from pregnancy and preventing the possibility of unsafe abortion as the key reasons for providing abortion 

services.  These medically-focused reasons are presented as being less ambiguous than socially-oriented 

reasons, making their decision to provide abortion more straightforward:  

“I'm Catholic, my religion and what I believe they tend to differ at some point.  I look at things in a 

medical and humanitarian way. Medically if this pregnancy would kill the woman then why keep it?  

…I've seen women dying out of pregnancy… So I try to match belief with what happens if we live in 

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the reality.” [Clinical officer, male, provider] 
	
1.1 Tipping points 


Participants’ shared conceptualisation of the reasons women and girls seek abortion as being “enough” or “not 
enough” to warrant abortion, and their apparent ease discussing medically-indicated abortion compared to all 
other reasons for abortion, suggests that both non-providers and providers understood abortion as a challenge to 
their personal morally-informed beliefs.  In their common narrative, the contextual factors surrounding abortion 
(from why a woman sought abortion to the likelihood she would seek unsafe abortion if refused) function as a 
series of tipping points that shift, or do not shift, abortion from iniquity towards moral acceptability.  The 
difference between non-providers’ and providers’ narratives is not whether or not abortion is morally wrong, but 
the extent and variety of reasons for abortion that they consider a tipping point.  Both non-providers and 
providers reported that in light of these tipping points, their decisions about whether or not to provide abortion 	
services were complex.    

For example, Dr Phiri identified himself as a provider of abortion but reported “mixed feelings” that echoed 
non-providers’ reports.  For him abortion is “help[ing] someone to kill someone”, an act that “borders in 
someone’s conscience”.  However, unsafe abortion was his tipping point and the reason that he now provides 
abortion as part of a “complete service” for women.  Nevertheless he continued to question his decision, 
emphasising that the service he provides is selective, not “grab[bing] anyone because she’s pregnant” but 
responding to an expressed need in a way that will save his clients’ lives:  
“I look at myself and am I doing something right, am I normal or am I not normal?” 
While some non-providers and providers reported firm and static beliefs about the provision of abortion, 
collectively the interview narratives suggest that for the majority of participants, decision-making about the 	
morality of abortion in particular circumstances and subsequently whether or not to provide abortion services, is 

a process.  Non-providers and providers reported that their reflections on abortion had varied over time in 
response to their perceptions of requests for abortion that they received or had heard about, and for some, 
appeared to be on-going and non-linear, dependent on the circumstances of each new request. 
Dr Mulenga illustrates the dynamic nature of decision-making.  She notes that while providing abortion when a 
woman presents bleeding is morally straightforward, being called upon to decide whether to offer abortion to a 
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woman who is “healthy and she says, ‘I want one’” is the “moment that most of us struggle”.  However, like Dr 
Phiri, she had recently decided to provide abortion in order to prevent women seeking unsafe abortions.  This 
tipping point had crystallised for her at a conference, hearing a doctor discuss her own abortion and calling on 
colleagues to consider the consequences of not providing safe services.  Nevertheless, the decision had been 	
difficult and despite pushing herself towards finality in her decision-making (“the decision has been made”) she 

was unconfident that it would remain consistent if tested by a request for abortion for reasons she did not think 
were ‘enough’.  
“My husband’s a doctor so we’ve had this discussion.  We’ve struggled with it because of my faith.  I 
have struggled, struggled and in that moment I did not make a religious decision.  I did not make a 
moral decision.  I made a decision of, ‘If I’m in the ER, then a woman comes to ask for it and I say I 
can’t and the one who can is in tomorrow and maybe tomorrow she’s over 12 weeks, she doesn’t come 
back.  She loses her courage and in the evening she’s gone to see some hocus-pocus woman 
somewhere who’s given her something and she comes in bleeding.  I'm still in the ER.  I will still have 
to attend to her and Lord forgive me, if that woman dies because that’s something I could have done 	
for her safely, properly and under controlled circumstances.’  So, for me it’s still a lot of processing but 

the decision has been made.  I want to provide it safely.  I don’t want to meet the woman who sleeps 
around all the time and then gets pregnant and she has a history of [abortions], Lord forgive me 
because then I might be able to say, “Okay, I am not taking part in this because this is a woman who 
should be responsible with her contraception”…. For me the biggest thing was, ‘Am I killing and are 
my reasons for killing justified?’” 

2. Practices of delivering abortion care 
Almost all participants described themselves as either providers or non-providers of abortion services.  However 
practitioners in both groups reported professional practices not wholly aligned with that positioning.  Rather, 	
their changing and context-dependent behaviours are fluidly positioned along a spectrum, from non-provision 

and obfuscation to consistent provision of services.  Only a small minority of participants reported behaviour 
consistently positioned at these extremes.  More commonly the complexity participants experienced in their 
beliefs about abortion appeared to underpin complexity in how they delivered abortion services.  Participants 
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across all cadres and facilities reported shared practices in relation to evaluating grounds for abortion and 
delivering it, pre-abortion counselling, and referral, that are likely to lessen women’s access to legally-permitted 
abortion. 
2.1 Evaluating reasons for abortion and delivery 
The majority of participants reported making their abortion care decisions on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the reasons abortion had been requested.  Rather than reflect Zambia’s legal framework, their narratives suggest 	
that these decisions were more commonly based on participants’ personal, morally-informed, positions: 

“Depending on your personal perception of the problem, you may agree or not agree with the reason 
the woman is seeking a termination and therefore based on that you might be able to offer or refer to a 
colleague who might take a different position…. we evaluate the patient according to case by case.” 
[Doctor, male, provider]  
In the case of non-providers, this meant that not all women were refused abortion services.  The very widely 
shared “exception” made of abortion to save a woman’s life has been noted; one self-reported non-provider 
additionally reported providing abortion in cases of congenital abnormality and others were accepting of 
abortion in cases of pregnancy resulting from rape.  However, it also meant that for a sizable minority of 
participants who self-identify as providers of abortion services, the reverse was true: not all women seeking 	
abortion on grounds that align with the law were provided services.   

There are several examples of the conditionality of provision by self-identified abortion providers in their 
interview narratives.  For the doctor quoted above, having recently given birth, having been left by one’s 
partner, and wanting to continue tertiary education were all “not enough”.  His reluctance to accept continuing 
education as a reason for abortion was shared by other self-identified providers of all cadres whose nuanced 
views were based not only on how far the woman had got in the education system but also their personal 
expectations of her future career opportunities.  For example, Community Healthcare Worker Mrs Mwale, 
working in a rural setting, reported advising a schoolgirl to return to school after birth and refusing to refer her 
to colleagues, and conversely, referring a university student for abortion “because [the client] wants to succeed 
in life”. 	
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Other self-identified providing practitioners discussed women seeking multiple abortions as presenting them 

with a “very, very big [moral] challenge” (Doctor, male).  Likewise, some providers noted that if a woman does 	
not agree to using contraception in future it was difficult for them to provide services “because she'll come back 	
again pregnant.” (Doctor, male, provider). 	
2.2 Counselling 	
The provision of pre-abortion counselling presents a similarly mixed picture.  Non-providers typically described 	
counselling as a conversation in which their aim was to dissuade clients from seeking abortion.  Some 	
commented that successfully changing a client’s mind about abortion was an indicator of quality in counselling.  	
Most reported delivering counselling that makes direct reference or allusion to religious teaching.   Some non-	
providers reported that they would be willing to refer clients to a providing practitioner following ‘unsuccessful’ 		
counselling in order to avoid the client seeking unsafe services elsewhere.  Neither cadre nor facility location 	

seemed to influence the nature of non-providers’ counselling, creating a consistent narrative across these 

interviews.  Interviews with a doctor working in a large urban hospital and rural community health worker 

illustrate this shared approach to counselling:  

“We just try to tell them to just keep the pregnancy.  First of all, you know, religiously ‘it is a life that 

you have’… ‘if you abort it means you kill’ … and ‘if you don’t kill the child there will be someone 

who could support the child’ things like that… we are different in terms of convincing people, 

counselling people to keep it, maybe I am not that good, maybe [another doctor] is better.”  [Doctor, 

male, non-provider]  

“I would say to her keep it, or if you don’t want to keep it better give it to me – I will keep the child for 
	
you… [If you insist] then I think I can just surrender out of your case because only you will be judged 


[by God]… Mostly, when you advise someone in that way they [understand] you and opt to keep the 
child.” [Community health worker, female, non-provider] 
While self-identified providers’ descriptions of their counselling were far more heterogeneous than non-
providers’, many reported putting a similar emphasis on encouraging clients to continue their pregnancies, as 
well as encouraging longer reflection on their decision or return for counselling with their partners or families.  
Two providers dissuaded clients from proceeding with abortion by emphasising the logistical and administrative 
burden involved, especially in rural areas.  Again, the narratives of self-identified providers working across 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

16
cadres and facility settings indicate that only if women had capacity to insist on abortion following this 
explicitly or implicitly dissuasive counselling, would the practitioner continue to facilitate it.  As Dr Phiri, 	
discussed above, commented:  

“Those who come in for seeking [abortion], they really knock for a long time for them to have it…They 
should insist and show the reason why they need it, for me to provide it.” 
The moral tensions about abortion these self-identified providers experienced are reflected in apparent 
contradictions within their descriptions of the counselling they provide:   
“We just counselled her, we said we can talk to your relatives, you can bring them we can talk about it 
together rather than terminating the pregnancy you can just keep it … It depends on my assessment of 
the history that she has given me... if this woman says that she cannot keep that child of course I can 
explain to her the advantages of keeping that baby and then the advantages of terminating that 
pregnancy… I think my beliefs [about abortion], I think they are not very important because as I have 	
said it is the law so my beliefs have got nothing to do with that.” [Senior midwife, female, provider]

2.3 Referral  
Referral to a doctor constitutes the core abortion service all non-doctors are required to carry out.  Doctors who 
claim conscientious objection to providing abortion must refer clients to another doctor.  Participants from all 
cadres, identifying as non-providers and providers of abortion services, discussed referral processes that add 
further complexity in abortion care services.   
As with provision of abortion and counselling, some participants reported behaviours aligned with national 
policy and law: some non-providers and providers reported making clear, timely referrals to providing doctors 
and were concerned not doing so would increase the likelihood of their clients seeking unsafe abortion.  
However, a continuum of conscience-based objecting behaviours was reflected in other participants reporting 	
referral practices that are likely to increase barriers to safe abortion care.  Participants from across the spectrum, 

including almost all self-identified providers who discussed it, described making vague referrals: rather than 
written or verbal communication to link clients with a named providing practitioner, they recommended their 
clients repeat their requests for abortion to another practitioner or at another health facility.   
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Frequently participants appeared to have not considered any implications of these vague referrals for the risk of 
unsafe abortion.  Nurse Nyirenda for instance, who considered herself a provider of abortion services, offered no 
reflection on any possible causal links in her account of having told a client she must return to her clinic with 
her husband before a referral could be made and the client later returning to the clinic needing post-abortion 
care.  In participants’ illustrations, clients are likely to have understood the tentative nature of the referrals as an 
indication that their requests for abortion were inappropriate.  For example, the clients of non-doctors who 	
reported telling them to effectively ‘take their chances’ with another provider are unlikely to have left the 

consultation reassured that the abortion they sought was their legal right.  Similarly, the reports of vague 
referrals by doctors who publically self-identify as providers but who nevertheless sometimes refused clients’ 
requests, suggest that clients are likely to receive this referral as a negative moral judgement on their request for 
abortion which may dissuade them from trying another safe provider.   
The emphasis on the verb ‘to try’ elsewhere in the referrals reported by a minority of non-providers may have 
been used by them explicitly as a tool to communicate to clients that abortion services may not be available 
elsewhere.   
“Sometimes, we just tell them that they should go to the big hospital and try to find out if they do that.  
Because I know that the general hospital conducts those procedures.”  [Nurse, female, non-provider] 	
Indeed, two non-providers commented that the vague referrals they had made are likely to have prevented 

clients from obtaining safe abortion.  Their descriptions of referral practices are shared by providers, suggesting 
that in some circumstances, practitioners from both groups may have used vague referral as a deliberate strategy 
to prevent abortion they had moral or religious reservations about.  
However, structural stigma about abortion within the health system also contributed to and facilitated nebulous 
referral processes.  Self-identified non-providers and providers in our sample had low levels of knowledge about 
the availability of abortion even when making referrals to a specific doctor or team.  Poor or non-existent 
feedback mechanisms from receiving doctors to referring practitioners left referring practitioners with little idea 
about whether they had referred clients to the right place or person, or whether they ought to have made a 
referral at all.  	
“Others cannot manage to come to the hospital.  They go back [home], then they do their own 

[abortion].  You see them coming back bleeding and you ask them “Did you go to the hospital?”… But 
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the problem [is] with the feedback… we don’t know whether they’ve been attended to…There’s no 
follow up.” [Senior nurse, male, provider]  
The lack of feedback mechanisms in the referral chain additionally meant that participants had no exposure to 
the consequences of the nature of their referrals for women’s health.  
Structural stigma within hospital facilities also extended the influence of conscientious objection on providers’ 
referral processes.  Doctors reported that senior doctors who oppose abortion prevent more junior doctors 
working within their teams from providing abortion either directly, by refusing to allow abortions in their 
clinics, or more commonly indirectly.  Indirect tactics were publically questioning the motives and morals of 	
providing colleagues, implying there would be career penalties for doctors who provide abortion, not building 

capacity of junior colleagues to provide abortion by denying them the training opportunity of observing and 
assisting abortion procedures, or making it impossible for junior doctors to perform surgical abortion by 
refusing to assist them in the event of an emergency.  Several doctors noted that the strength of expression both 
for and against abortion among senior doctors dissuades junior doctors from discussing abortion – including 
who provides abortion and challenging poor service provision – so as to avoid conflict.   
“[Speaking about providing abortion] is not something that… you can just do openly, especially in our 
setup or when you are also training. So they will think ‘this is one of the people doing this.’” [Doctor, 
male, provider] 
As a result, some doctors self-identifying as providers reported making referrals for abortion they would 	
otherwise have provided themselves.  Referrals typically involved instructing a client to return to the hospital at 

a time or day medical teams headed by consultants who provide abortion are scheduled to work.  These 	
participants were aware that such referrals introduce delays to providing abortion care, may communicate to 	
clients that what they have requested is problematic and could dissuade clients from returning for safe abortion 	
care.  	
Our analysis suggests that the influence of senior non-providing doctors on less senior potentially-providing 	
doctors in large health facilities may inform the vague referrals and lack of feedback noted by participants 	
working across the health system.  By encouraging providing practitioners in large facilities to hide or at least 	
not openly discuss their provision, referring practitioners of other cadres working outside large facilities are 	
especially limited in their ability to make clear referrals to them.  		
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	

Discussion  

Continuum of conscience-based care practices 

We set out to explore how healthcare practitioners working across the Zambian health system understand 

abortion and how they report their abortion care practices in light of this.  We found remarkably similar 

discourses about abortion and reported behaviours among practitioners who presented themselves as non-

providers and providers of abortion services.  These similarities were consistent across genders, roles and 

facilities, contrasting previous research that has identified distinct differences in conscientious objection 

according to cadre and associated training and exposure to international debates and messages (e.g. Aniteye & 

Mayhew, 2013).   
	
In our data, participants share a narrative in which abortion is a morally challenging procedure that is – or is not 


– to varying degrees shifted towards moral acceptability by the reasons for abortion or the potential 
consequences of not providing abortion safely.  For the majority of participants these contextual factors 
presented a series of tipping points, rather than a single decisive argument for providing abortion.  Subsequently, 
some non-providers, as identified by Fink et al. (2016), but significantly, many who identified as providers, 
reported that their decisions about whether or not to provide abortion services were sometimes difficult and 
were changeable, both over time and in response to the circumstances of a pregnancy or abortion.    
Participants in our study reported delivering abortion services in light of their complex moral beliefs about 
abortion.  Rather than simply providing or not providing abortion services according to their role, participants 
additionally expressed their conscience-based discomfort with abortion under certain circumstances in how they 	
delivered care.  In this way, conscientious objection in practice could be understood as a continuum of 

behaviours rather than a binary position.  While a few participants reported static practices positioned at either 
end of the spectrum (always objecting or never objecting to abortion and delivering services accordingly), 
participants identifying themselves as both non-providers and providers of abortion services reported practices 
that are more accurately conceptualised as being fluidly placed along it.   
Our analysis suggests that the presence of a continuum of conscience-informed practices is likely to be 
responsible for considerable complexity in the delivery of safe abortion in Zambia.  We found that both self-
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identified non-providers and providers do not permit or permit abortions inconsistently, dependent on their 
personal evaluations of the reasons abortion has been requested rather than the law; that both non-providers and 
providers deliver counselling designed to dissuade clients from abortion; and that both non-providers and 	
providers’ make referrals for abortion care that are vague to the extent that women seeking abortion may 

conclude that the safe, legal abortion they had requested is unlikely to be provided by any practitioner, 
increasing the possibility that they will obtain unsafe abortion outside the formal health system.   
There is no evidence as to how typical lack of formalised referral patterns for abortion care is.  In the research  
setting vague referral practices were facilitated by structural stigma.  The limited pool of practitioners who will 
provide abortion, especially in rural settings with fewer doctors, the influence of non-providers within urban 
hospital’s hierarchies, and the reluctance of doctors who provide abortion to openly discuss their practices at 
work, all underpinned inappropriate referral practices and meant practitioners had limited knowledge of the 
consequences of their referrals.   
The likely result of the practices our participants reported is that obtaining safe abortion is a matter of luck.  	
Whether or not the healthcare practitioner a woman meets identifies as being a conscientious objector/non-

provider or provider may not predict the treatment they receive.  
Conceptualising conscientious objection in Zambia 
How then should we conceptualise conscientious objection to abortion in the Zambian context?  The continuum 
of conscience-based practices rather than binary status of objector and provider we identified, fits well with 
Harris et al. (2016)’s model delineating the three domains of practitioners’ beliefs, actions and self-
identification.  In our study, practitioners self-identified as non-providers based on moral beliefs about abortion, 
but reported counselling and referral practices that are not aligned with the legal and policy framework for 
conscientious objection; other practitioners self-identified as providers of abortion but, based on their moral 
beliefs about abortion, did not consistently provide the abortion services expected of their cadre.   	
The crux of Harris et al.’s conceptualisation of conscientious objection is to encourage consideration of the 

overlaps and importantly, voids, between the three domains, for the measurement and regulation of 
conscientious objection.  Indeed, our results urge evaluation of the utility of focusing solely on self-identified 
conscientious objection if our aim is to assess and measure the impact of practitioners’ conscience-based beliefs 
on the accessibility of legally permitted safe abortion services.  In this study, had we considered only healthcare 
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practitioners who report to object to providing abortion services, we would have missed the ways those who 
identified themselves as providers of abortion services also limited women’s access to care.  By considering 
both types of practitioner in our study, and exploring the relationships between their self-identification and their 
reported practices, we exposed a series of unexpectedly shared access-limiting behaviours.  The fact that 
practitioners saw themselves as providers of abortion services, even when reporting practices that would limit 	
services, suggests that those managing healthcare facilities in Zambia may need to look beyond the legally 

permitted exercise of conscientious objection to meet the obligation of ensuring women have access to abortion 
set out in the Ministry of Health’s Standards and Guidelines.  
Harris et al. propose that their model of conscientious objection, offered as a basis for prevalence survey tools, 
should be refined as new data on the way conscientious objection is practiced comes to light.  Our data suggest 
that the model and subsequent tools could be usefully expanded to include healthcare practitioners who are not 
legally permitted to perform abortions, such as community health workers, nurses, midwives and clinical 
officers in our study.  In Zambia these cadres are often the first point of contact for women seeking abortion and 
influence whether, how and when they obtain one.  Doing so would not change the components of the model, 
just who is considered within it. 	
Finally, given participants’ changing and non-linear positions on abortion and reported practices, our data 

supports the value of longitudinal approaches to considering their prevalence.  Doing so in Zambia would lead 
to better identification of conscientious objection in practice.  As noted by Harris et al., survey tools developed 
from their conceptual model could be used to measure change in individual practitioners’ position in the three 
domains over time.   
Relevance for interventions  
Our results highlight two important considerations for interventions to increase access to safe abortion.  
Firstly, the study underlines the importance of context for understanding conscientious-based abortion care 
practices.  In Zambia, constitutionally a “Christian nation”, while social, political or economic pressures  
influenced healthcare practitioners’ provision of abortion care as elsewhere (Harris at al. 2018), the continuum 	
of conscience-informed practices we identified most strongly reflect entrenched and widely shared religiously-

informed norms about the moral status of abortion.  As observed in other African settings (e.g. in Ethiopia by 
Holcombe (2018)), healthcare practitioners in our study most commonly made their decisions about providing 
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abortion services in light of competing concerns to protect women’s health and around their understandings of 
the morality of abortion.  However discourses employed in their interview narratives cannot easily be divided 
into moral discourses about the ethics of abortion employed by non-providers/conscientious objectors on one 
side and medical discourses about women’s health employed by providers on the other.  Some non-providers 
were concerned about the public health consequences of their non-provision and while some providers did draw 
on a medical discourse to explain why safe abortion was necessary, their overarching discourse was frequently 
moral: that preventing maternal morbidity and mortality from unsafe abortion is the ‘right’ thing to do.   	
Very few participants of any cadre discussed the provision of abortion as a means to reproductive rights.  

However it is an emphasis on rights – of physicians to abstain from providing abortion and for women to receive 	
it – that underpins the Zambian legislation and policy on conscientious objection.  Similarly, international 	
research, policy and advocacy all situate the need for accessible safe abortion services within rights-based 	
development paradigms (Unnithan & de Zordo, 2018).  For example, there has been heightened attention and 	
commitment to emphasising professional ethics and the importance of respectful woman-centred care in recent 	
international midwifery education (UNFPA, 2014).  These discourses were not present in the narratives of 	
practitioners in our study.  Rather, our findings suggest that in Zambia at least, different ways of situating this 	
agenda may be needed if it is to have salience for the practitioners called upon to operationalise it.  	
Secondly, our results make clear that in Zambia, removing or limiting conscientious objection may not 		
significantly decrease barriers to safe abortion services since healthcare practitioners who self-identified as 	

providers also reported practices that limit service availability and quality.  Instead, in lieu of longer-term social 

change towards gender equity, interventions could usefully consider advice and guidance for all practitioners – 

including those not legally permitted to carry out abortion - on how their beliefs about abortion should be 

reflected in the abortion services they are called upon to provide. Such guidance could be underpinned by 

formalised procedures for managing conscience-based objections to delivering or referring for abortion services 

within the health system.  



Conclusion 

In Zambia, providing and non-providing healthcare practitioners’ understandings of abortion as a morally-
	
challenging procedure is likely to have significant impacts not just on whether or not women receive safe 
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abortion care, but the nature of services that are delivered.  If the evidence we present from Zambia is not 
unique, it is likely that existing or future prevalence data focused exclusively on the binary position of 
conscientious objection, practitioners who self-identify as objectors, and/or those legally permitted to enact 
conscientious objection, will underestimate the extent of conscience-based influences on accessing safe legal 
abortion.   
Our research suggests three further research agendas related to conscientious objection.  First, while there is 
prospective evidence from a range of settings about the consequences for women denied abortion care, much 
less is known about the actual practices of directive counselling.  Second, our research highlights the importance 
of non-providing gatekeepers, such as community healthcare workers, for accessing abortion and the need to 	
better understand how they are implicated in practices of conscientious objection.  Finally, although there is a 

sizable evidence base describing practitioners’ knowledge and understanding of abortion laws, our study 
suggests that research on the implications of these understandings for practices of conscientious objection, and 
the outcomes for women, are needed.     
  
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Table 1: Sample Description  
Characteristics N=51 
Sex 
Male 
Female
31 
20 
Occupation 
Clinical Officer 
Community Health Worker 
District Medical Officer 
Doctor (non-specialist) 
Midwife 
Nurse 
Specialist obstetrician gynaecologist
3 
8 
3 
6 
12 
5 
14 
Setting 
Rural  
Urban 
Not clear
21 
20 
10 
Reported position 
Conscientious objector 
Non-conscientious objector 
Not clear 
21 
26 
4 
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Research highlights (3 to 5 bullets conveying article's unique contribution to knowledge. Max 85 characters 
including spaces) 
• Objectors and providers share conscience-based narratives about abortion 
•  Both report provision, counselling and referral practices that lessen abortion access  
•  Practitioners’ decision-making about abortion provision was on-going and non-linear 
• Conceptualisation of conscientious objection should include how care is delivered 
•  Conscience-based practices of all cadre influence access to abortion services 
